












On Social Identity, Subjective Expectations, and the  



















The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author. 
 
 
 On Social Identity, Subjective Expectations, and the
Costs of Control
Gerhard Riener and Simon Wiederholdy
August 19, 2011
Abstract
Controlling employees can have severe consequences in situations that are not
fully contractible. However, the perception of control may be contingent on the
nature of the relationship between principal and agent. We, therefore, propose
a principal-agent model of control that takes into account social identity (in the
sense of Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). From the model and previous litera-
ture, we conclude that a shared social identity between the principal and agent has
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 035both a cognitive, that is, belief-related, and a behavioral, that is, performance-
related, dimension. We test these theoretical conjectures in a labor market ex-
periment with perfect monitoring. Our ￿ndings con￿rm that social identity has
important implications for the agent’s decision-making. First, agents who are so-
cially close to the principal (in-group) perform, on average, more on behalf of the
principal than socially distant (no-group) agents. Second, social identity shapes
the agent’s subjective expectations of the acceptable level of control. In-group
agents expect to experience less control than no-group agents. Third, an agent’s
reaction to the monitoring level she eventually faces also depends on social identity.
If the experienced level of control is lower than the expected control level, that is,
the agent faces a positive sensation, the increase in performance is less pronounced
for in-group agents than for no-group agents. In the case of a negative sensation,
however, in-group agents react stronger than no-group agents. Put di￿erently, be-
ing socially distant from the principal ampli￿es the performance-enhancing e￿ect
of a positive control surprise and mitigates the detrimental performance e￿ect of
a negative surprise.
JEL code: C92, M54, D03
Keywords: Control; Identity; Employee motivation; Principal￿agent theory; Lab
experiment
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0351 Introduction
Control can have severe consequences in principal-agent relationships. Early empirical
work by Barkema (1995) suggests this, as do experimental studies by Dickinson and
Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Ploner et al. (2010), and, from a macroeco-
nomic perspective, Porta et al. (1997). This work has largely ignored that the costs and
bene￿ts of control may depend on the nature of the relationship between the principal
using the control devices and the controlled agent. Referring to case-study evidence
from the U.S. steel industry, Akerlof and Kranton note that ￿[w]hat matters is not more
or less monitoring per se, but how employees think of themselves in relation to the ￿rm￿
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2008, p. 212). This notion has also found experimental support
in Dickinson and Villeval (2008). We develop their arguments further and propose that
a shared group identity between the principal and agent in￿uences the latter’s subjec-
tive expectations of the appropriate level of control. This ￿individually expected￿ level
of control a￿ects the agent’s perception of the principal’s actual control decision. We
argue that the most in￿uential factor in determining the agent’s performance is not the
actually experienced level of control but its deviation from the subjective control belief.
If the agent’s appraisal of the level of control imposed by the principal is a function
of the social distance between principal and agent ￿ we will show that it is indeed ￿
a socially close agent will react di￿erently to the principal’s control decision than a
socially distant agent facing the same deviation from the expected level of control.
We propose a formal modeling framework that allows us to integrate social identity
(in the sense of Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005) 1 into a simple principal-agent model.
1Following Ashforth and Mael (1989), we will use the notions of social identity and group identity
3
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principal can eliminate the agent’s most opportunistic choices by imposing a minimum
e￿ort requirement that the agent is not allowed to fall short of. 2 However, agents are free
to exceed this minimum performance requirement, that is, to exert e￿ort voluntarily.
The primary variable that characterizes the principal-agent relationship in this model
is social identity. Following the de￿nition developed in social psychology, we refer
to social identity as ￿that part of an individuals self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value
and emotional signi￿cance attached to that membership￿ (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). 3 The
more the individual perceives herself in terms of the characteristics she shares with
other group members, the more likely she is to act on behalf of other members of the
group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Turner et al., 1987; Van Knippenberg, 2000). For the
purposes of our analysis, we distinguish between two general types of principal-agent
relationships: in-group and no-group (Tajfel, 1970). In-group individuals identify at
least partly with each other and behave in accordance with the social identity based
on that group membership. No-group principal-agent relationships are characterized
by the absence of a shared group identity; for example, one can think of both parties
as being anonymous to each other. Notice that while our classi￿cation is categorical,
the intensity of an in-group member’s identi￿cation with the principal is a matter of
interchangeably.
2As Falk and Kosfeld (2006), we argue that the minimum e￿ort restriction implemented by the
principal is the equivalent of employing control devices in the agent’s work environment.
3This de￿nition has been extensively applied to organizations (for instance, Abrams et al., 1998;
Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Benkho￿, 1997; Hogg and Terry, 2000; Ouwerkerk et al., 1999). See also the
literature on organizational identi￿cation, which is usually traced back to March and Simon (1958).
Riketta (2005) provides a recent overview.
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Our modeling framework illustrates that the degree of social distance between prin-
cipal and agent can have cognitive and behavioral implications for the agent. On the
one hand, social identity may a￿ect the level of both the agent’s e￿ort and control
belief. We expect in-group agents to be more willing to exert e￿ort on behalf of the
principal than no-group agents. At the same time, we predict that in-group agents
believe that they will face less control. On the other hand, there may be intergroup
di￿erences in the performance response to control sensations. We refer to sensation
as the deviation of the agent’s expected level of control from the actually experienced
one. A positive sensation occurs if the agent’s control belief exceeds the level of control
faced. A negative sensation is de￿ned accordingly. The model suggests that for both
types of agents the willingness to exert e￿ort on behalf of the principal increases in the
sensation. However, we expect to ￿nd intergroup di￿erences when taking into account
the nature of the sensation. For positive sensations, we hypothesize that no-group
agents will react with a higher level of reciprocation than in-group agents. For negative
sensations, however, no-group agents will reciprocate less, that is, their performance
will not decrease as much as for in-group agents.
We conduct a simple labor market experiment to test these behavioral predictions
in a controlled environment. Our experimental design is inspired by Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) but extends this and others’ work in a number of important ways. First, we
allow di￿erent levels of control in a within-subject design. The principal does not have a
4For the ease of illustration, we abstract from formally modeling the intensity of an agent’s identi-
￿cation with the principal. In the experiment, however, we are to some extent able to control for the
degree of group identi￿cation through a question after the group formation stage.
5
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We observe the agent’s choices for each degree of control under the strategy method
(Selten, 1967). Second, all subjects play a second stage where agents are remunerated
for solving a real-e￿ort task. Before solving the task, they must decide how much of
their future remuneration they are willing to share with the principal. The principal
can choose a minimum share that the agent must deliver. Instead of using the strategy
method, agents receive information on the required minimum share before making their
sharing decision and performing the task. The virtues of this procedure are twofold.
First, we are able to assess the robustness of the ￿ndings from the strategy method in
a situation that requires real e￿ort. Second, and even more importantly, the real-e￿ort
game allows us to study the in￿uence of an experienced sensation on the behavior of
the subjects.
We ￿nd in both e￿ort sharing and the real e￿ort that in-group agents expect lower
levels of control than no-group agents and are on average more willing to exert ef-
fort voluntarily on behalf of the principal. In-group agents’ e￿orts exceed the e￿orts
selected by no-group agents for all control levels. We also observe that both types of
agents increase their voluntary performance in the level of sensation. However, there are
intergroup di￿erences in the reactions to sensation. Having experienced a positive sen-
sation, no-group agents act more favorably than in-group agents. The opposite is true
for negative sensations; in-group agents reduce e￿ort to a higher degree than no-group
agents. Thus, in the polar cases of maximum and minimum sensation, the intergroup
di￿erences in the levels of e￿ort selected nearly vanish. These ￿ndings imply that the
stimulating impact of social identity on the agent’s performance strongly depends on the
6
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costly, especially for in-group principals, and in extreme cases can completely outweigh
the bene￿ts of social identity. When we extrapolate our ￿ndings to situations in which
the principal can choose even higher levels of control, social identity can easily back￿re
on the principal and actually reduce the agent’s e￿ort.
The previous literature on psychology in organizations recognized the importance
of social identity as a powerful concept to explain individuals behavior, for example,
turnover decisions (Dick et al., 2004a; Haslam, 2001; Haslam and Ellemers, 2006). Con-
sequently, fostering an individual’s identi￿cation with an organization has been stressed
as one of the key means of improving sta￿ retention (Davies, 2001) and increasing an
individual’s willingness to exhibit extra-role behavior (Dick et al., 2004b). However,
using real-world data to estimate the behavioral consequences of social identity is prob-
lematic because it requires intimate knowledge of the nature of the principal-agent rela-
tionship. To establish social identity’s causal e￿ect on an agent’s performance response
to a principal’s control decision, one would have to consider a myriad of variables: per-
sonal characteristics, economic dependency on the job, organizational tenure, recency
of membership in the organization, satisfaction with the organization, informal organi-
zational structure, and the existence of multiple foci of identi￿cation. 5 These factors
5Multiple group memberships are prevalent in real-world organizations (Albert and Whetten, 1985;
Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Van Knippenberg and Van Schie, 2000). For instance, an employee’s social
identity may be derived not only from the ￿rm as a whole but also from her department, union,
team or work group, etc. Indeed, apart from a few examples (for instance, Theory Z organization
as described in Ouchi, 1981), a single organizational identity is unlikely to be encountered in most
complex organizations (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Because norms, values, goals, and performance
standards might be di￿erent at the organizational and subunit levels, the presence of multiple foci of
organizational identi￿cation renders the investigation of the performance e￿ect of control conditional
on the nature of the principal-agent relationship di￿cult.
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ted variables is a serious concern when these variables are not properly controlled for.
Using a laboratory experiment to study how social identity based on group membership
a￿ects an agent’s behavior ensures us that
￿ social identity is salient, that is, the individuals are aware of the group member-
ship,
￿ the decision-relevant social identity is unique,
￿ group interests are strictly performance-related and do not focus on, for example,
interpersonal relations, and
￿ performance is under the full volitional control of the agent, that is, independent
of knowledge, skills, abilities, etc.6
A further virtue of the experimental approach is that we can clearly distinguish between
￿task performance￿ and ￿contextual performance.￿ 7 The former refers to e￿orts that are
part of the "usual" job requirements. The latter relates to one’s other e￿orts in the
environment in which task performance takes place, encompassing behaviors such as
helping others and taking others’ interests into account (Moorman, 1991; Moorman and
Blakely, 1995; Van Knippenberg, 2000). In our view, contextual performance is a more
appropriate indicator of the e￿ects that group identity has on e￿ort because the agent
6According to Van Knippenberg (2000), these criteria must be met to impose a causal relationship
between social identity and performance.
7In this context, see also the distinction between ￿perfunctory￿ and ￿consummate￿ performance in
Hart and Moore (2008). In perfunctory performance, a contract can be written, and its terms can be
judicially enforced. Consummate performance concerns the spirit of the contract and is not legally
enforceable.
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performance on the job the agent was hired to do. Because the agent is likely to bene￿t
from it in the form of bonus payments or promotion opportunities (Van Knippenberg,
2000), task performance is less contingent on the motivations that correspond to group
membership. In the experiment, each principal-agent game is designed as a one-shot
interaction, and all of the e￿ort conducted on behalf of the principal is foregone by the
agent. Consequently, the agent does not have any strategic incentive to exert e￿ort
voluntarily.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst work that investigates the role of
subjective control beliefs in determining agents’ reactions to control. In particular, we
show that social identity in￿uences both the formation of beliefs over control and the
reaction to the control level experienced. This complements a previous work carried
out by Abeler et al. (Forthcoming) that analyzes the reaction to reference points in
wages; however, it does so without principal-agent interaction. Our study hopefully
motivates further research on the role of social identity and its interaction with subjec-
tive expectations within organizations. Particularly interesting in this respect would be
an investigation of the long-run impact of control and how it corrodes previous positive
experiences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
the modeling framework and derive predictions. Section 3 explains the experimental
design, which is followed by a discussion of our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
by providing the implications of our ￿ndings and highlighting directions for future
research.
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2.1 Sensation-Dependent Preferences
In this section, we outline a modeling framework that we use to derive hypotheses on
the belief- and performance-related consequences of social identity. In the model, we
consider a situation in which the principal chooses a control level that is observed by the
agent before the latter decides how much e￿ort to expend on behalf of the principal. We
denote the level of control that the agent expects by ^ m(c). Further, we assume that the
agent’s utility depends on the magnitude of the deviation between the expected degree
of control and the degree of control eventually faced, that is, the level of sensation.
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2008), the agent’s utility is composed of three com-
ponents. First, the agent receives a constant wage, w, with her utility increasing in
the level of w. Second, the agents exerts an e￿ort of e, which causes a positive and
non-decreasing marginal dis-utility. In other words, we assume that the costs of e￿ort
have the following form: f0(e) > 0 and: f00(e) = 0. Third, and most importantly, the
sensation term, denoted by g((^ m m);e), de￿nes the utility e￿ect of a deviation of the
agent’s expected level of control from the actually experienced one. The utility function
of the agent then reads:
UA(e;m) =lnw   f(e) + g((^ m   m);e) (1)
This formulation of the agent’s utility captures the relationship between overall
10
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can be regarded as the general attitude toward the task the agent has to perform, which
stems from sources such as pay satisfaction, lnw, speci￿c task characteristics, f(e), and
the (dis)utility stemming from positive or negative control sensations (regarding the
latter, see also Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).
Sensation as a driver for behavior Let us de￿ne   ^ m   m as the di￿erence
between the agent’s individually expected and actually experienced degrees of control,
which captures the level of sensation. 8 Assuming that the wage payment and e￿ort
dis-utility are independent of social identity, we can abstract from lnw and f(e) in




A (e;m) =g(;e) (2)
We further assume that the sensation term in (2) satis￿es the following properties:
8In the results section, we will de￿ne the empirical equivalent of sensation.
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twice di￿erentiable for e and for  6= 0.








The ￿rst part of Assumption 2 means that the agent’s willingness to exert e￿ort
increases in the level of sensation, that is, the larger the sensation, the larger the agent’s
utility. The second part of Assumption 2 re￿ects the idea that, for a given level of
sensation, reciprocity increases in e￿ort. The intuition for this assumption can be seen
from the following example. Suppose that there are two agents, Adam and Eve. Eve is
willing to work hard and expects little control. Adam also expects a low control level,
but he is not willing to work as hard as Eve. Let both Adam and Eve face high levels
of control level and experience the same kind of negative sensation. Our assumption
is that this sensation will disappoint the hard-working Eve more (or at least not less)
than the rather lazy Adam, so her utility decreases at least as much as Adam’s does.
Assumption 3 establishes that the positive e￿ort-dependence of reciprocity decreases
in the level of e￿ort. If this were not the case, the optimization calculus for the agent
would be trivial, as he would always choose the maximum possible e￿ort. Assumption
4 demonstrates how the e￿ect that sensation has on utility changes in the level of e￿ort.
12
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utility-enhancing e￿ect of any sensation. Put di￿erently, the more ready an agent is to
expend e￿ort, the more sensitive he is to the behavior of the principal and the stronger
the utility e￿ect of sensations.
2.2 Behavioral Hypotheses
The agent maximizes (2) w.r.t. e s.t. e > m, where m is the control choice of the
principal, which the agent takes as given. 9 We solve the agent’s optimization problem
in Appendix A and derive the following conjectures concerning the behavior of the
agent:
Conjecture 1. Due to the existence of two equilibria, we may observe agents who
do not exert any e￿ort beyond the minimum requirement set by the principal, that is,
e = m. However, there may also be agents with a positive level of voluntarily expended
e￿ort, that is, e > m.
Conjecture 2. For any positive e￿ort increment, e > m, e￿ort increases in the level
of the sensation.
9Note that the participation constraint always binds by assumption. Therefore, our model is highly
applicable to employment in the public sector or large organizations with high "sunk utility costs"
(for example, due to job security and the right to a pension). Moreover, the previous literature has
demonstrated that public sector employees have certain personal characteristics that make working in
the public domain preferable over working in the private sector. It has been found that, compared
to private employees, public employees are more concerned with status than with money (Warwick,
1980), government managers perceive the relationship between pay and performance as being weaker
(Buchanan, 1974, 1975; Ingraham, 1993; Perry et al., 1989; Rainey, 1983), and public employees strive
less for pecuniary gains (Rainey, 1983) and more frequently doubt that good performance leads to
promotions (Rainey, 1979; Rainey et al., 1995).
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stracting from group identity. Therefore, both conjectures should only hold regarding
the e￿ort responses to control or sensation within groups. However, the model can
easily be extended to incorporate intergroup di￿erences as well. To allow us to for-
mally distinguish between in-group and no-group agents, we introduce the parameter
c 2 f0;1g, where c = 1 refers to an in-group relationship and c = 0 identi￿es a no-
group relationship. We think of in-group and no-group agents as being di￿erent in
several dimensions.
First, social identity theory implies that the level of e￿ort exerted for the principal
depends on social identity, that is, e = e(c). It has been found that in-group members
take on the group’s perspective and are therefore more likely to expend e￿ort on be-
half of the group. Early laboratory studies ￿nd that simply assigning an individual to a
group can be su￿cient to induce in-group favoritism (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Brewer,
1979). Evidence from the public sector suggests that the distance between principals
and agents is expected to directly a￿ect whether an agent shirks or works (Chaney and
Saltzstein, 1998; Scholz, 1991). In a similar vein, experimental work carried out by
Dickinson and Villeval (2008) shows a preferential treatment of subjects with lower so-
cial distance; however, their study is unable to distinguish identity from social pressure
e￿ects (for more on the e￿ects of group identity, see Chen and Li, 2009). Therefore, we
modify Conjecture 1 to incorporate the between-group di￿erences in the inclination to
exert e￿ort voluntarily.
Conjecture 3. The proportion of in-group agents exceeding the minimum performance
level set by the principal is higher than the respective proportion of no-group agents.
14
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social identity. Compared to their no-group counterparts, we expect in-group agents to
supply, on average, more e￿ort on behalf of the principal.
Conjecture 4. e(c = 1) > e(c = 0)
Second, the discussion of reference point e￿ects in Hart and Moore (2008) implies
that the individually expected level of control depends on social identity, that is, ^ m =
^ m(c). Applying their theory of contracts as reference points to our setting, principal-
agent pairs with a shared common (positive) experience conclude some kind of implicit
contract, which a￿ects expectations of the appropriate level of control. Because they
expect their principals to be more cooperative, in-group agents have lower control beliefs
than agents in an anonymous principal-agent relationships.
Conjecture 5. ^ m(c = 0) > ^ m(c = 1)
Finally, Conjecture 5 suggests that e￿ort, e, and sensation, , are positively associ-
ated. This should hold for both types of agents. However, there may still be intergroup
di￿erences in the performance response to sensation. In the case of a negative sensation,
 < 0, we expect the decrease in the willingness to perform on behalf of the principal
to be more pronounced for in-group than for no-group agents. This is because high
control is likely to be seen as incongruent with the implied group identity. Following
Hart and Moore (2008), in-group agents might interpret a negative sensation as the
principal breaching the implicit contract. The agent, in turn, retaliates, a phenomenon
that has been reported in the psychological literature by Koehler and Gersho￿ (2003). 10
10The existing literature is usually silent about the consequences of group members not acting in
15
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d(c = 1) > de
d(c = 0) for  < 0
If the sensation faced is positive,  > 0, we expect in-group agents to reciprocate less
than their no-group counterparts. Intuitively, no-group agents may be more pleasantly
surprised by a positive sensation than in-group agents. Therefore, the former attach
a greater value than the latter to this sensation, reacting with a relatively greater
performance increase. However, because the previous literature does not provide clear
guidance on the direction of intergroup di￿erences for a positive surprise, we formulate
Conjecture 7 as:
Conjecture 7. de
d(c = 0) Q de
d(c = 1) for  > 0
Our behavioral predictions di￿er from those discussed in Akerlof and Kranton
(2005). They assume that strict supervision alters the nature of the principal-agent
relationship; that is, an in-group relationship suddenly becomes a no-group relation-
ship. In our model, supervision or control does not a￿ect the type of the relationship
between the principal and agent. Rather, a negative control sensation, possibly in-
terpreted as a sign of distrust, evokes even harsher negative feelings for the in-group
agent. This may be a more realistic view of in-group and no-group relationships, as
positive experiences will neither be completely eliminated by a negative experience nor
will they return subjects to a state similar to having never shared a common experience
with each other. Rather, we think that the weight the agent attaches to control sen-
sations depends on the nature of the principal-agent relationship, as does the agent’s
behavioral reaction to them.
accordance with other group members’ beliefs, norms, and values. There are, however, studies that
focus on the potentially negative e￿ects of identi￿cation on performance, for example, if informal group
norms promote the minimization of work e￿orts (Van Knippenberg, 2000).
16
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To test the above conjectures, we conduct a simple labor market experiment. We
implement a design that allows the principal to control the output of the agent by
imposing a minimum e￿ort restriction. Subjects are divided into groups of two, and
the roles of principal and agent are randomly assigned. In the ￿rst step we induce group
identity in the in-group treatment. In the no-group treatment, individuals perform a
task in isolation. To test Conjectures 1, 3, 4, and 5, subjects play an e￿ort choice game
using the strategy vector method. Agents must state the e￿orts they are willing to
exert for each level of control the principal can choose. This stage of the experiment
is an extended version of the experimental design implemented by Falk and Kosfeld
(2006). In light of the discussion in the previous section, sensation only occurs in
situations where the principal’s control decision is revealed to the agent. Therefore,
to test Conjectures 2, 6, and 7, subjects play a real-e￿ort game after the e￿ort choice
game, where the agent learns about the principal’s control decision before making his
performance choice. We now turn to a detailed explanation of the stages. 11
Group Formation Phase
In the group-formation phase, in-group subjects played a weakest-link game. Subjects
could distribute 50 experimental currency units (ECU, where 1 ECU was worth 0.10
¿) to a private or public account. The returns to the group account were the smallest
of the two agents’ contributions to the public account, doubled by the experimenter.
The agents’ total payment was the sum of the public and group account. After an
11We also ran two pilot sessions with a total of 36 participants whose results are not reported here.
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strategy for this game via an online chat. The aim of the this phase was to induce
a feeling of belonging to the same group, as a consequence of the shared principal-
agent experience. The coordination game had an obvious focal point, to ease the
establishment of group feelings. 12 We refer to the principal-agents pairs that played the
coordination game as in-group.
There was no competition among groups in the later stages of the experiment, , nor
did we reveal the control and e￿ort choices made by the other principal-agent pairs to
the subjects. Although the social identity literature has demonstrated that salience of
other group(s) and competition among groups reinforce awareness of one’s group mem-
bership (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Worchel et al., 1998), our goal was to investigate
whether even quasi-minimal group induction, stemming only from a one-time interac-
tion in the initial coordination game, is su￿cient to detect behavioral di￿erences. After
the game and the disclosure of the results, subjects had to give their partner feedback
on how fair they found their partner’s behavior. The subjects could pick any natural
number between 1 (very unfair) and 5 (very fair). Both partners received this feedback
before the next stage.
Subjects in the no-group treatment were asked to perform a slider task (developed
by Gill and Prowse, 2011). The challenge here was to bring 48 sliders into the middle
position within 3 minutes. Participants in this task received a ￿at fee of 80 ECU,
independent of their performance. 13
12Techniques of group induction have long been used in social psychology (for example, Turner,
1981) but only recently found their way into the experimental-economics literature (among others,
Heap and Zizzo, 2009).
1380 ECU were the average payo￿ of in-group principals and agents, respectively, in the pilot sessions.
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The e￿ort-choice game was designed parsimoniously, without work environment frames.
Each agent had an initial endowment of E = 1;2;:::;117, where e 2 E represents the
total e￿ort exerted by the agent. The marginal monetary costs for the agent to expend
1 unit of e￿ort were constant and set to 1. The principal had no initial endowment.
The amount transferred to him by the agent was doubled by the experimenter so that
the principal received P = 2e. The principal could restrict the agent’s choice set by
enforcing one of the following three minimum transfers: Emin 2 f0;6;21g. We chose
those control levels to investigate what a small (relative to the endowment) increase
in control triggers in the agent. Agents played this game using the strategy vector
method; that is, they had to decide on e￿orts for all possible minimum e￿ort levels
without knowing the principal’s actual decision. We refer to the di￿erence between the
agent’s e￿ort choice and the principal’s control as voluntary sharing.
Although we are not able to test all of the theoretical conjectures developed in
Section 2, the e￿ort-choice game still has a raison d’Œtre. First and foremost, it allows
for comparisons to previous studies on the costs of control, most notably Falk and
Kosfeld (2006) and Ploner et al. (2010). Second, the strategy vector method enables us
to elicit di￿erences in the agents’ e￿ort choices for a small (relative to a large) increase
in the degree of control. Finally, we want to investigate whether social identity is salient
in both cold and hot decision-making situations.
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After the e￿ort-choice game, the participants played a real-e￿ort game. Here, the agents
had to solve summations, and the remuneration depended on the number of correct
answers. Before the agent started the task, he had to decide what share of his revenues
to transfer to the principal. Because, again, the principal had no initial endowment, the
agent’s transfer was the only source of income for the principal at this stage. However,
the principal could restrict the agent’s choice set by imposing a minimum transfer,
choosing his control level from the following possibilities: Emin 2 f0%;10%;20%;40%g.
The agent was free to transfer a larger share to the principal than the latter requested
as minimum, while this transfer was not doubled. The agent received 10 ECU for each
sum correctly solved.
Although Bruggen and Strobel (2007) ￿nd no di￿erence in e￿ort-choice and real-
e￿ort games in economic experiments, we think that the real-e￿ort setting in our ex-
periment is more informative than the e￿ort-choice game. First, given the evidence on
earned versus windfall money in dictator-like experiments, voluntary sharing is more
costly for the agent in the real-e￿ort game, as it involves own work (for an extreme
example, see Cherry et al., 2002). Second, the strategy method forces the subjects
to make their decisions cold. Therefore, the agent’s e￿ort reaction to, in particular,
sensation might not be properly revealed.
Belief elicitation
To assess the role of deviations from expected control in shaping the agents’ behavior,
we elicited subjective control beliefs. The agents were asked to report their perception
20
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 035of the likelihood of each possible control level available for the principal to choose. The
principals had to reveal their beliefs regarding the agents’ control beliefs (second-order
beliefs). We did not incentivize these answers because there is evidence that eliciting
expectations with or without incentivization for accuracy does not yield di￿erent results
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Grether, 1992). 14
After having completed all of the tasks, the subjects were informed of their payment.
The payo￿-relevant stage was chosen at random. Then, subjects were asked to ￿ll out
a questionnaire in return for an additional ¿1. Furthermore, they received ¿2.50 for
arriving on time for the experiment.
Questionnaire
In the questionnaire, besides the standard demographic observations, we elicited sub-
jects’ attitudes toward control, employing the questions already used by Falk and Kos-
feld (2006) and Ploner et al. (2010). In particular, subjects were exposed to di￿erent
work-place scenarios. For each of these situations,we ask subjects about their work
motivation.
Implementation
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the
computer laboratory at the University of Jena. Subjects were recruited via the ORSEE
online recruitment system (Greiner, 2004). In total, 330 subjects participated in the
14G￿chter and Renner (2010) carry out a public-good game and ￿nd that incentivized beliefs are more
accurate there. However, incentivization has the (undesirable) side e￿ect of increasing the subjects’
willingness to cooperate.
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mental session lasted an average of 45 minutes. The average payo￿ was ¿8.70, which
is roughly equivalent to the hourly wage of a local research assistant. The maximum
(minimum) payo￿ was ¿16.30 (¿2.50).
4 Results
4.1 E￿ort-choice game
Performance We begin by examining the agents’ e￿ort decisions by group and con-
trol level. Our ￿rst result is that we ￿nd support for Conjecture 1. For both in-group
and no-group agents, we observe voluntary sharing (de￿ned as an agent’s contribution
beyond the principal’s minimum requirement) at all control levels. However, judg-
ing by Mann-Whitney tests15, the proportion of agents choosing to share exactly the
minimum requirement imposed by the principal does not signi￿cantly di￿er between
groups.16 This challenges Conjecture 3, which predicts that in-group agents are more
likely to voluntarily share their endowment with the principal than anonymous agents. 17
Next, we turn to the intergroup di￿erences in voluntary e￿ort, depicted in Figure
15If not otherwise stated, we report the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests throughout the
paper.
16The test statistics are as follows: No control: p = 0.238; Min 6: p = 0.392; Min 21: p = 0.102.
17However, the mere fact that the agents and principals had interacted before the e￿ort-choice game
may not have always been su￿cient to render group identity salient. Recall that after the coordination
game, both the principal and agent are asked how fair they ￿nd the actions of their partner. We
de￿ne group induction as successful if the agent’s rating is either 4 or 5. Excluding the 14 in-group
principal-agent pairs for whom group induction can be expected to have not worked properly, we ￿nd
that Conjecture 3 is con￿rmed for maximum control. The respective test statistics are No control: p
= 0.880; Min 6: p = 0.182; Min 21: p = 0.017.
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Note: This ￿gure shows the average voluntary sharing for the three di￿erent control levels by group.
We ￿nd signi￿cant intergroup di￿erences in voluntary sharing for all control levels (Mann-Whitney
test, No control: p = 0.004; Min 6: p = 0.063; Min 21: p = 0.018).
We ￿nd that voluntary sharing decreases in the degree of control. This holds for
both in-group and no-group agents. Consistent with Conjecture 4, however, no-group
agents’ average voluntary sharing is signi￿cantly lower than in-group agents’ sharing
at all levels of control. This indicates that belonging to a social group (as compared
to being anonymous) entails behavioral consequences. The size and signi￿cance level
of the treatment di￿erence is largest when the principal trusts the agent completely.
Comparing low and high monitoring, the order of magnitude of the between-group
18The underlying table with test statistics can be found in Appendix B.
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aggregate level, in line with Dickinson and Villeval (2008), although they do not split
their results by control level. Interestingly, the proportion of subjects that share the
same amount at all control levels (unconditional sharing) is approximately two and
a half times higher in the in-group than in the no-group treatment (26.74 percent
vs. 10.12 percent; p = 0.006). Moreover, out of the 23 in-group agents that shared
unconditionally, ten chose to transfer at least half of the endowment (that is, sharing
58 or more). Only one of the eight unconditionally sharing no-group agents transferred
half of his endowment, while all of the others shared less. 20 In addition, a variance ratio
test shows that the variance is higher for subjects in the in-group treatment for each
level of control, signi￿cant at the 1 percent level for both no and maximum control ( No
control: p = 0.006; Min 21: p = 0.002) and signi￿cant at 5 percent for the intermediate
level of control (Min 6: p = 0.030).
Comparing the cumulative distribution functions of voluntary sharing, we ￿nd a
signi￿cant di￿erence between the groups for each control level. This re￿nes the above
results from the Mann-Whitney test. In the no control condition, we can reject the null
hypothesis that the distributions of the two agent types are the same at the 1 percent
signi￿cance level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.007). In the cases of low and high
19For the subsample of those in-group principal-agent pairs for which group induction worked prop-
erly, we always ￿nd a more signi￿cant di￿erence in voluntary e￿ort between in-group and no-group
agents.
20This result is in line with previous ￿ndings by van Leeuwen and van Knippenberg (1999). They
let the participants of their experiment, divided in groups, put sheets of paper in envelopes. The
experimenters measured identi￿cation with the work group for each individual and elicited beliefs
about other group members’ task e￿orts. The e￿ort of participants with a relatively high group
identi￿cation was to a large degree independent of the e￿ort they expected from the other group
members. Low identi￿ers, however, increased their own e￿ort substantially when they expected higher
e￿ort from their fellow group members.
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= 0.096 and p = 0.056, respectively). Moreover, we ￿nd that voluntary sharing under
lower control levels ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the sharing increment under
higher control levels for both agent types.
Beliefs A glance at the agents’ beliefs in Figure 2 reveals that agents who had pre-
viously interacted with the principals believe no control to be signi￿cantly more likely
and maximum control to be signi￿cantly less so than agents without prior experience
with the principals.21 The perceived likelihood of facing low control does not di￿er
between the two treatments. A comparison of the cumulative distribution functions of
the agents’ control beliefs con￿rms these ￿ndings. For No control and Min 21, we can
reject the null that the distributions of both agent types are similar at the 5 percent
level (Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, p = 0.026 and p = 0.031, respectively). For the inter-
mediate control level, Min 6, we do not observe intergroup di￿erences in the control
beliefs (p = 1.00).
21When assessing reactions to beliefs, a serious concern is the presence of the so-called false consensus
e￿ect (Ross, 1977). We will, therefore, not speculate on the magnitude of the e￿ects but concentrate
on the treatment di￿erences, as the false consensus e￿ect should not di￿er between treatments.
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Note: This ￿gure illustrates no-group vs. in-group agents’ perceived likelihood that their particular
principal will choose no control, low control, and high control, respectively. We observe signi￿cant
di￿erences between groups in the No control and Min 21 conditions (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.016
and p = 0.001). Beliefs do not di￿er by group in the Min 6 condition (p = 0.886).
Thus far, we have compared the means and cumulative distribution functions of
the agents’ subjective control beliefs. To link the experiment to the theoretical model,
however, we need to de￿ne the individually expected level of control, ^ m. We regard the
control level that the agent believes is most likely to occur, that is, the mode of the
control beliefs, as an appropriate representation of ^ m. In particular, we ￿nd it unlikely
that subjects base their decisions on the expected values of their beliefs, as this would
require cumbersome calculations. 22
22We are aware that relying only on the modal belief as the agent’s control reference point means
that we do not take the ￿strength￿ of the mode into account. Recall that beliefs are elicited by asking
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than their in-group counterparts. We ￿nd support for this hypothesis in the data. The
average (median) value of modal control beliefs is 10.59 (6) for in-group agents and
15.08 (21) for no-group agents. This di￿erence in modal control beliefs is signi￿cant at
the 1 percent level (p = 0.003). The equality of the cumulative distribution functions
of the modal control beliefs of the two types of agents can be rejected at the 5 percent
level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.016). In summary, the results in the e￿ort-
choice game suggest that a shared experience in the coordination game has cognitive
and behavioral implications: in-group agents perceive the likelihood of being monitored
di￿erently than their no-group counterparts and are willing to share more with their
principals.
Similar to Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and in contrast to Ploner et al. (2010), we ￿nd
that under certain conditions the ￿hidden costs￿ of control are substantial enough to
undermine the e￿ectiveness of control. Compared to no control, e￿ort is lower when the
principal imposes a control level of 6. This is the case for both in-group and no-group
agents (p = 0.001). In the case of maximum control, agents’ e￿orts do not signi￿cantly
di￿er from the no control case (p = 0.168 for in-group and p = 0.306 for no-group).
the agents to attach a likelihood to each possible control level. When using modal control beliefs,
we treat an agent who thinks that he will face the maximum degree of monitoring with probability
100 percent the same as an agent who believes that he will face the maximum level of control with
probability 34 percent (the latter is the ￿weakest￿ modal belief in our speci￿cation with three control
levels). Therefore, we also used the expected value of control beliefs as an approximation of the agent’s
individually expected level of control. This alternative speci￿cation leaves all of the results reported
above una￿ected.
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Control We ￿nd treatment e￿ects in the principals’ control decisions. In-group prin-
cipals monitor their agents less often than no-group principals. As can be seen in
the upper panel in Table 1, the proportion of principals deciding to monitor is sig-
ni￿cantly higher in the no-group than the in-group treatment (Fisher’s exact test , p
= 0.060). In particular, only 5 percent of the no-group principals decide to trust the
agent completely, while this percentage is more than three times higher for in-group
agents (approximately 16 percent). 23 The occurrence of treatment e￿ects in the prin-
cipals’ implementation of control is even more striking considering that the variance
of in-group agents’ sharing decisions is signi￿cantly higher than for no-group agents.
This holds for all control levels, implying that su￿ciently risk-averse principals should
monitor in-group agents to a greater degree than no-group agents.
23However, in contrast to the our ￿ndings for the agents, it does not make a di￿erence in the
comparison of in-group and no-group principals’ control choices whether group induction in the pre-
game phase can be expected to have worked well. The p-value of Fisher’s exact test of the treatment
e￿ects in the principals’ control decisions is 0.060 for the total sample and for the subsample of
principals with coordination satisfaction greater than 3.
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Principal
Control decision No-group In-group Total
No mon 4 14 18
Min 6 24 21 45
Min 21 51 51 102
Total 79 86 165
Fisher’s exact test, p-value: 0.060
S.O. belief No-group In-group Di￿ .
No mon 11.430 (10.431) 23.756 (22.087) -12.325***
Min 6 32.506 (21.344) 28.035 (19.623) 4.471
Min 21 56.063 (25.106) 48.209 (24.245) 7.854**
Observations: 165 principal-agent pairs
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of principals’ decisions and beliefs in the e￿ort-choice
game, di￿erentiated by group treatment. Control decisions are given as counts. The beliefs of the
principal are the second-order beliefs over the control beliefs of the agents. Standard deviations are
given in parentheses. Beliefs are compared using a Mann-Whitney test:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05, 
p < 0:01, while the distributions of the counts are tested with a two-sided Fisher’s exact test.
Second-order beliefs The intergroup di￿erence in the principals’ second-order be-
liefs is consistent with our ￿ndings on the agents’ actual beliefs. A signi￿cantly higher
proportion of in-group principals think that the agent does not expect any control from
him, while the opposite is true for the second-order beliefs regarding maximum control.
For the intermediate level of control, we do not observe a signi￿cant treatment e￿ect.
Further, it is interesting that only two no-group principals think it is most likely that
agents believe that they will not face any control, while 16 in-group principals per-
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the modal beliefs of in-group and no-group principals, we ￿nd them to be signi￿cantly
di￿erent at the 10 percent level (p = 0.087).
4.2 Real-e￿ort game
In this section, we investigate the e￿ect of social identity on the agents’ decisions in
a real-e￿ort experiment. This adds realism to the analysis because agents completing
a real-e￿ort task may be less inclined to share what they earn. In addition, it can be
argued that emotions play a larger role in decision making when real e￿ort is involved
(Charness et al., 2004), so we can examine the e￿ect of control sensations on sharing
decisions in this context. In general, we expect our setting in the real-e￿ort game (re-
ward for the agent only after successfully completing a task; feedback on the principal’s
control decision before the agent decides on sharing) to be closer to principal-agent
relations in real-world organizations. 24 The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we
show summary statistics on the agents’ voluntary e￿orts and the principals’ control
decisions. Then, in an econometric framework, we test for intergroup di￿erences in the
agents’ reactions to sensation resulting from deviations of expected control from actual
control. According to our behavioral hypotheses, negative sensations are emotionally
more important to in-group agents than to anonymous agents. Therefore, the former
are expected to decrease voluntary sharing more substantially than the latter when a
negative sensation occurs. As discussed above, we do not have prior expectations on
24When making inferences on the agent’s e￿ort in response to control, we only look at his sharing
decisions and ignore the actual performance in solving summations. We do so to ensure that e￿ort is
still fully under volitional control (Van Knippenberg, 2000), just as in the e￿ort choice game.
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Performance Before discussing the performance results, it is important to emphasize
again that, in contrast to the e￿ort-choice game, the principal’s control decision in the
real e￿ort game is revealed to the agent before he makes his sharing decision. Therefore,
the agent does not hypothetically decide on a level of e￿ort without knowing which
control state will eventually occur. Rather, the agent conditions his sharing decision
on the observed control level.
First, regarding Conjecture 1, we observe both in-group and no-group agents who
decide to transfer only what the principals force them to share, while we do observe vol-
untary sharing as well. Moreover, the intergroup di￿erence in the proportion of agents
deciding to exceed the minimum requirement set by the principal is signi￿cant at the
1 percent level (p = 0.008).25 This result provides support for Conjecture 3. In Figure
3, we depict voluntary sharing by group and control level. We ￿nd striking similarities
to our ￿ndings from the e￿ort-choice game. At any level of control, agents who had a
shared experience with their principals in the coordination game transfer more volun-
tarily than agents who had no prior interactions with their principals. However, the
number of in-group and no-group observations di￿ers for each control level 26, so it may
be misleading to analyze treatment e￿ects by level of control. Across control levels, we
observe that the average voluntary e￿ort is two and a half times greater for in-group
than for no-group agents (p = 0.002).27 When comparing the cumulative distribution
25We observe a similar test statistic when excluding the 14 principal-agent pairs that were not able
to produce a satisfactory result in the coordination game.
26Table 5 in Appendix C provides further details.
27In the subsample of principal-agent pairs for whom group induction worked properly we again ￿nd
somewhat stronger results: In-group agents that evaluated their partner’s behavior as fair or very fair
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no-group agents’ distributions are the same at the 1 percent level (Kolmogrov-Smirnov
test, p = 0.009).



























Note: This ￿gure illustrates the agent’s voluntary sharing in the real-e￿ort game by level of control.
Sharing here means the percentage of total earnings in the real-e￿ort game that the agent chooses to
transfer to the principal. The agent makes this decision before the real-e￿ort game is played.
Beliefs Our ￿ndings regarding the agents’ beliefs also match the previous results
from the e￿ort-choice game well. We observe signi￿cant treatment di￿erences in the
beliefs for no and maximum control, while the beliefs are statistically indistinguishable
for intermediate levels of control (Figure 4). 28 Regarding the cumulative distribution
(feedback of 4 or 5) are on average three times as reciprocal as no-group agents (p = 0.002).
28Excluding those in-group agents where group induction can be expected to have not worked prop-
erly, again, does not alter the results.
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monitoring (Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, p < 0.000).





























Note: In this ￿gure, we depict the agents’ beliefs regarding the various control levels that the principals
may choose. In-group agents expect their principals to trust them completely signi￿cantly more often
than their no-group counterparts do (Mann-Whitney test , p = 0.076), and expect to face maximum
control signi￿cantly less frequently (p = 0.002). There are no signi￿cant di￿erences for intermediate
levels of monitoring (Min 10% : p = 0.416; Min 20%: p = 0.831).
Next, we turn to the modal control beliefs, which are our experimental equivalent
for the individually expected level of control, denoted by ^ m in the model. As in the
e￿ort choice game, we again ￿nd support for Conjecture 5. No-group agents have
greater control expectations than their in-group counterparts. On average, no-group
agents ￿nd a control level of 31.91 the most likely, which is signi￿cantly higher than in-
group agents’ average modal control beliefs, 22.05 (p < 0.001). The respective medians
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no-group agents’ modal control beliefs are di￿erent at the 1 percent signi￿cance level
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.001).29
Reaction to sensation We now turn to the analysis of the agents’ reactions to
sensation. In our study, we refer to sensation as the di￿erence between the agent’s
modal belief regarding control and the actual level of control faced. A negative sensation
occurs if the modal control belief is lower than actual control, which we interpret as
some sort of disappointment felt by the agent. A positive sensation means that the
agent experienced control lower than he expected.
29When using the expected value of control beliefs instead of modal beliefs, we obtain qualitatively
similar results.
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Note: This ￿gure shows the histograms of the experienced sensation by group. The bars
indicate the share of the agent population that faced a sensation of size i. The intergroup
di￿erence in sensation is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.023).
Figure 5 presents the distributions of sensation for the two types of agents. It be-
comes apparent that the strong treatment di￿erences in the individual control beliefs
discussed above also translate into di￿erences in sensation. In particular, we ￿nd that
no-group agents face higher sensations on average. Interestingly, the average value of
in-group agents’ sensation is negative (-5), while no-group agents experience positive
sensations on average (2.05). Concerning the respective cumulative distribution func-
tions, we can reject similarity between the agent types at a signi￿cance level of 10
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Next, we investigate whether the reaction to sensation in voluntary sharing is dif-
ferent between groups. Before we come to the regression analysis, we show the agents’
reactions to sensation graphically in Figure 6.





















































Note: This ￿gure presents linear ￿tted graphs of the relationship between sensation and voluntary shar-
ing. We use data for positive and negative sensations. Zero sensations are not included in calculating
the slopes and are extrapolated.
Some results are noteworthy. First, support for Conjecture 2 comes from the obser-
vation that all sensation-response functions in Figure 6 are positively sloped. Second,
in-group agents share more voluntarily than their no-group counterparts at any level
of sensation. This supports Conjecture 4. Finally, the graph gives some indication that
Conjecture 6 is also supported by the data. Consider the negative sensations plotted
in the left panel in Figure 6. As expected, the drop in the sharing increment for neg-
ative sensations is more pronounced for in-group than for no-group agents. Because
the between-group gap in voluntary sharing shrinks in the negative sensation, there
36
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 035is almost no di￿erence between agent types at the minimum level of sensation, -40.
The picture is reversed for positive sensations, depicted in the right panel in Figure 6.
Here, the slope is steeper for no-group than for in-group agents, which suggests that the
marginal increases in voluntary sharing for no-group agents exceed those for in-group
agents when experiencing positive sensations. At the maximum level of sensation, 40,
little sharing di￿erence between groups remains. Thus, the reciprocal reaction to pos-
itive sensations (in terms of voluntary sharing) is more pronounced for no-group than
for in-group agents. In the absence of any sensation, however, voluntary sharing by
in-group agents is higher than by no-group agents. In fact, there is almost a 10:1 di￿er-
ence in the ￿baseline￿ reciprocity between in-group and no-group agents. On average,
in-group agents voluntarily share approximately 10.7 percent of their earnings if they
are not surprised, while the voluntary sharing of no-group agents is only slightly more
than 1 percent (p = 0.001).
The e￿ect of sensation on voluntary sharing is more rigorously investigated in Table
2. Because our dependent variable, voluntary sharing ( Voluntary), can only take non-
negative integer values and displays signs of over-dispersion 30, we perform a negative
binomial regression. Standard errors in the regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered by session.31
30We report more formal tests of over-dispersion in Table 2.
31Our results remain qualitatively the same under a range of alternative speci￿cations. First, as
another means of adjusting for heteroskedasticity, we also estimated weighted negative binomial models,
using the share of observations for sensation of level i in the total number of observations as a weight.
Moreover, we estimated the models with a full set of session dummies as additional regressors and the
standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Finally, we also conducted probit and OLS
estimations.
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Ingroup  neg. sensation 0.057
(0.028)
Observations 151 151 151
Wald chi-squared 128.95 164.62 203.79
Prob > chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
alpha 1.707 1.617 1.537
(0.160) (0.174) (0.179)
2 for alpha=0 1725.632 1470.375 1348.030
Note: This table reports the results of a negative binomial regression of the e￿ects of sensation on
voluntary sharing by group. We refer to sensation as the deviation of expected modal control from
actual control. Because 14 subjects had ￿at prior beliefs over control levels, these regressions include
14 fewer observations than in the full sample. The negative binomial model was chosen to account for
the over-dispersion of the data. As can be seen from the table, the results from a likelihood-ratio test
for alpha (estimated without robust standard errors) indicate over-dispersion for all speci￿cations.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which are clustered by session, are presented in parentheses.
* z<0.10, ** z<0.05, *** z<0.01.
38
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 035The positive and highly signi￿cant coe￿cient on Sensation in Column 1 indicates
support for Conjecture 2; voluntary sharing increases in sensation, that is, the di￿erence
between individually expected and actually experienced monitoring. In Column 2, we
investigate whether no-group and in-group agents di￿er in their reactions to sensation.
However, we do not yet distinguish between the two types of sensation (positive or
negative). In-group is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the principal and agent
played the coordination game at the beginning of the experiment and 0 otherwise. The
coe￿cient on In-group is positive and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level, which indicates
that in the absence of any sensation, in-group agents share more voluntarily than no-
group agents. The interaction term In-group  sensation allows for treatment e￿ects
in the response to sensation. Due the inclusion of the interaction term, Sensation
in Column 2 refers to no-group agents. Although the positive impact of sensation on
voluntary sharing is somewhat weaker for no-group agents compared to the total sample,
it is still positive and signi￿cant. The interaction term is not signi￿cant; hence, in-group
and no-group agents increase voluntary sharing in sensation equally. However, before
we conclude that both agent types respond to sensation in the same way, it behooves us
to consider arguments and evidence in support of a subtler hypothesis: that behavioral
di￿erences between the agent types depend on the nature of the sensation. We test
for this in Column 3. The variable Pos. sensation measures the di￿erence between
the agent’s modal control belief and the actually experienced level of control if this
di￿erence is strictly above zero. Otherwise, Pos. sensation equals 0. Neg. sensation
is de￿ned accordingly; that is, it exhibits non-zero (and negative) values if the agent’s
modal control belief is strictly lower than the experienced level of control. Treatment
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 neg. sensation, respectively. We ￿rst restrict our attention to positive surprises.
The positive and signi￿cant coe￿cient on Pos. sensation shows that no-group agents
voluntarily share more the larger the (positive) di￿erence between the expected level of
control and experienced control. The negative coe￿cient on In-group  pos. sensation
indicates that the e￿ect on sharing of a positive sensation is less pronounced for in-
group than for no-group agents. This results re￿nes Conjecture 7. Facing a negative
sensation, no-group agents do not seem to react in terms of voluntary sharing; the
coe￿cient on Neg. sensation is insigni￿cant. However, there is a signi￿cant interaction
e￿ect. The positive coe￿cient on In-group  neg. sensation indicates that an in-group
agent who experiences a negative sensation decreases voluntary sharing by more than
the respective no-group agent. This result provides support for Conjecture 6. Hence,
there are signi￿cant treatment di￿erences in the reactions to sensation, but these are
only visible when accounting for the nature of the sensation. 32
Questionnaire Results from the questionnaire provide further evidence that the
agent’s relationship to the principal, developed in the initial coordination game, is
driving our results on intergroup di￿erences. The attitudes toward control generally do
not signi￿cantly di￿er between the two types of agents.
32All coe￿cients are of the same sign and of a comparable magnitude as those presented above when
we exclude in-group agents who did not provide a su￿ciently positive feedback on their partners in
the initial coordination game, that is, a rating below 4.
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Control The principals’ control decisions and second-order beliefs are shown in Table
3. Consistent with the results of the e￿ort-choice game, there are treatment di￿erences
in the principal’s choice of control (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.094). Compared to their
no-group counterparts, in-group principals are more often inclined to choose no or low
control. However, it is also apparent from Table 3 that only 8 percent (3 percent) of the
in-group (no-group) principals decide not to restrict the agent at all, which indicates
that trusting the agent completely is too risky of a choice for the majority of principals.
It is nevertheless striking that, in relative terms, in-group principals select no or low
control three times as often as no-group principals (6.3 percent vs. 19.76 percent).
Second-order beliefs Turning to the second-order beliefs, a picture similar to the
e￿ort-choice game emerges. In-group principals expect their partners to believe that
they are not monitored more frequently and maximally monitored less frequently than
no-group principals (p = 0.002 and p = 0.007, respectively). There are no treatment dif-
ferences for the two intermediate control levels. We also observe intergroup di￿erences
in the modal second-order beliefs. For instance, only one no-group principal thinks that
the agent ￿nds no control most likely, while eight in-group principals have this belief.
This is the same 1:8 ratio that we observed in the e￿ort choice game. However, we ￿nd
no signi￿cant di￿erence between the two types of principals in the modal second-order
beliefs (p = 0.181).33
33The results do not change if those principals are excluded from the sample who were not satis￿ed
with their partners in the initial coordination game (rating below 4).
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Principal
Control decision No-group In-group Total
No mon 2 7 9
Min 10% 3 10 13
Min 20% 30 26 56
Min 40% 44 43 87
Total 79 86 165
Fisher’s exact test, p-value: 0.094
S.O. Belief No-group In-group Di￿.
No mon 5.671 (6.271) 15.907 (20.191) -10.236***
Min 10% 15.418 (13.127) 18.698 (14.683) -3.280
Min 20% 27.203 (15.011) 24.779 (12.635) 2.423
Min 40% 51.709 (26.115) 40.616 (22.386) 11.093***
Observations: 165 principal-agent pairs
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of principals’ decisions and beliefs in the real-e￿ort
game, di￿erentiated by group treatment. Control decisions are given as counts. The beliefs of the
principal are the second-order beliefs over the control beliefs of the agents. The median belief is 30
for in-group and 40 for no-group principals. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Beliefs are
compared using a Mann-Whitney test:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01, while the distributions of
the counts are tested with a two-sided Fisher’s exact test.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the e￿ect of control on performance in a principal-agent frame-
work. Including concepts from identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005,
2008) in a simple principal-agent model, we propose that the agent’s control belief is
42
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 035contingent on the social distance to the principal. We expect an agent who identi￿es
himself with the principal, that is, the former partly de￿nes himself in terms of salient
group membership (in-group), to have a di￿erent control reference point than an agent
who is unknown to the principal (no-group ). We formalize how subjects respond (in
terms of e￿ort) to deviations from the individually expected control level. Based on this
modeling framework, we derive hypotheses about the di￿erences between agent types in
their reactions to a principal’s control. We hypothesize that the between-group di￿er-
ences in the agents’ behaviors depend on the nature of the control sensation, with the
latter being de￿ned as the di￿erence between the expected and actually experienced
control levels. We expect in-group agents, on average, to be more willing to exert e￿ort
on behalf of the principal than no-group agents. However, this sharing discrepancy is
smaller the more negative the control sensation faced by the agent. Intuitively, no-group
agents are less disappointed by negative sensations than their in-group counterparts.
Using a modi￿ed version of the principal-agent game developed by Falk and Kosfeld
(2006), we experimentally test the validity of these hypotheses. Unlike the experiment
in Falk and Kosfeld (2006), the principal can choose between three di￿erent minimum
performance requirements, and we observe the agent’s choices for these three control
levels using the strategy method. Furthermore, we conduct a real-e￿ort experiment, in
which we reveal the principal’s control decision before the agent decides how much e￿ort
to exert for the principal. We manipulate the social distance between the principal and
agent with the help of a coordination game with an obvious focal point that played
prior to the control game.
We ￿nd that in-group agents are less frequently monitored and, on average, supply
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control depends heavily on the relationship between principal and agent. First, there
are pronounced intergroup di￿erences in the individually expected level of control. That
is, as compared to their no-group counterparts, in-group agents expect to be monitored
signi￿cantly less by their principals. Second, in-group agents who experience a positive
sensation reciprocate less than no-group agents. This is, to the best of our knowledge,
a new result in the literature on control. Third, if the principal’s control exceeds the
agent’s expectation, in-group agents’ performances decrease more sharply than that of
no-group agents.
We contribute to the research on the relationship between social identity and work
motivation and task performance. Previous studies yield converging evidence in support
of a positive impact of identity on motivational and performance-related factors (for
an extensive review, see Van Knippenberg, 2000). Little is known about the possible
detrimental consequences of identity. In this paper, we propose a channel through
which a shared identity between the principal and agent may negatively a￿ect the
latter’s performance. If the agent feels that the principal does not act in accordance
with the social identity based on their group membership, he may be inclined to punish
this behavior. In our experiment, we ￿nd that identity generally stimulates the agent’s
willingness to conduct e￿ort on behalf of the principal. However, we also observe
that agents, especially in-group agents, retaliate for control levels they perceive as
inappropriately high.
Group memberships (even multiple ones) are central to organizational life. Therefore
our research also has implications for organizations. These can be e￿ectively illustrated
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far-reaching government reform in the beginning of the 1990s (Gore, 1993), public
purchasing functions became more decentralized and less rule-bound (Kelman, 2002,
2006; McCue and Pitzer, 2000). It has been argued that a closer connection between
the purchasing agent and end-user leads to higher service bene￿ts being enjoyed by the
latter, which more than o￿sets potential cost savings realized through volume purchases
(McCue and Gianakis, 2001). Although we are not aware of any study investigating
whether the above government reform was successful in achieving its objectives, our
results suggest that purchasing o￿cers in this changed procurement environment may
indeed be more dedicated to ￿pleasing the customer.￿ Conversely, if end-users are not
su￿ciently aware of their social distance from government buyers and what is expected
in terms of appropriate behavior, a closer connection between the agent and principal
may well back￿re on the principal and actually reduce the agent’s e￿ort. How behavior
that is regarded as incongruent with the implied social identity a￿ects principal-agent
relationships in the long run, possibly corroding group identity, is a promising avenue
for future research.
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The agent maximizes equation (2) w.r.t. e s.t. e > m, where m is the control choice of
the principal, taken as given by the agent.
max UA (e;m) = g (;e) (3)
subject to e  m
The Lagrangian to this problem is:
LA () = g (;e) + (m   e) (4)
The Kuhn Tucker conditions read:
@LA
@e = g
0(;e)     0 (e  0) (5)
@LA
@ = m   e  0 (  0) (6)
e
 [g
0(;e)   ] = 0 (7)
(m   e) = 0 (8)
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This leads to the following conditions:
￿ e = 0 _ g0(;e)    = 0
￿  = 0 _ (m   e) = 0
I:) If  = 0 (the constraint is non-binding)
a) e = 0 : no solution since Assumption 3 holds;
b) g0(;e) = 0: possible solution.
II:) If  6= 0, it follows that e = m. Depending on the shape of g(;e), a binding con-
straint can be optimal.
One solution to the agent’s maximization problem is to not exert e￿ort beyond the
minimum requirement set by the principal (solution II:) ). In the case of a positive
e￿ort increment, solution I:b) determines how the agent responds (in terms of e￿ort)
to changes in the experienced control sensation. We use the implicit function theorem
to derive an expression for the derivative de=d without imposing the functional form









From Assumption 4 and Assumption 3, it follows that de=d is positive.
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Table 4: E￿ort-choice game: Summary statistics of the agents’ voluntary sharing deci-
sions and beliefs by group
Agent
Voluntary sharing No-group In-group Di￿.
if No mon 26.646 (2.197) 37.698 (2.879) -11.052***
if Min 6 16.734 (2.223) 24.302 (2.720) -7.568*
if Min 21 7.392 (1.776) 14.477 (2.400) -7.084**
Belief No-group In-group Di￿.
No mon 21.468 (2.380) 32.291 (2.908) -10.822***
Min 6 23.962 (1.838) 23.907 (1.886) 0.055
Min 21 54.570 (2.868) 43.802 (2.794) 10.767***
Observations: 165 principal-agent pairs
Note: This table reports summary statistics of the agents’ decisions and beliefs, di￿erentiated by group
treatment. Agents’ voluntary sharing decisions and all subjects’ beliefs are presented as averages, where
standard deviations are given in parentheses. The agents’ beliefs are the ￿rst-order beliefs regarding
the probability of facing the respective control level. Thus, the beliefs add up to 100 for each agent
type. E￿ort levels and beliefs are compared using a two-sided Mann-Whitney test:  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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Table 5: Real-e￿ort game: Summary statistics of agents’ voluntary sharing decisions
and beliefs by group
Agent
Voluntary sharing No-group In-group Di￿.
3.519 9.244 -5.725***
(7.056) (13.243)
Belief No-group In-group Di￿.
No mon 14.684 (16.852) 22.244 (22.894) -7.561*
Min 10% 13.203 (9.781) 15.919 (14.076) -2.716
Min 20% 21.772 (12.728) 23.047 (16.557) -1.274
Min 40% 50.342 (26.074) 38.791 (26.137) 11.551***
Observations: 165 principal-agent pairs
Note: This table reports summary statistics of the agents’ voluntary sharing decisions and beliefs in
the real-e￿ort game, di￿erentiated by group treatment. The average value of voluntary sharing is
presented. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The agents’ beliefs are the ￿rst-order beliefs
regarding the probability of facing the respective control level. Thus, the beliefs add up to 100 for each
agent type. E￿ort levels and beliefs are compared using a two-sided Mann-Whitney test:  p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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